Compliance Center
Our products use AES-256 encryption, a strong lock for data, and layers of defense. In the Secrets Manager, you can choose to hold the key yourself with takehsm.
Customer-Held Keys, Honestly
For Leased secrets in the Secrets Manager, you hold the key in a takehsm key holder that you run. A copy of our database, even with our master key, opens nothing for that class. Managed secrets are the default. The platform can read them for an approved caller. Customer-held keys are live. The zero-knowledge options page lists what is live.
No Storage Access
We cannot decrypt Leased secrets from storage
You Hold the Key
Your key holder keeps the key-encryption key
Metadata Stays Visible
We can still see names, sizes and timing
Bounded Exposure
While your holder is online, we get only what your policy allows
What Customer-Held Keys Change
Unlike most cloud services, you can choose to keep the key yourself. For Leased secrets we never hold the key-encryption key, so we cannot decrypt them from storage. If you lose the key everywhere, nobody can recover the data, including us.
Your encrypted data sits on our servers. The key stays with you. This is a technical control, not a certification. SOC 1 and SOC 2 work is in progress.
Encryption Architecture
Our layers of keys enforce complete tenant isolation and encrypt each user's data. Each key chain is mathematically independent.
Cryptographic Stack: AES-256-GCM (AEAD) with PBKDF2-SHA256 key derivation (600K+ iterations) • CSPRNG-generated unique nonces per operation • Authenticated encryption with built-in integrity verification
Technical Specifications
Cryptographic Algorithms
- Encryption: AES-256 in GCM mode (AEAD)
- Key Derivation: PBKDF2-SHA256 with 600,000+ iterations
- Random Generation: CSPRNG (SecureRandom)
- Integrity: HMAC-SHA256 verification on all ciphertexts
Key Hierarchy & Storage
- DEK (Data Encryption Keys): 256-bit per user
- KEK (Key Encryption Keys): 256-bit per tenant
- EWK (External Wrapping Key): 256-bit, client-managed
- IV/Nonce: Unique 96-bit per encryption operation
Security Properties
- IND-CCA2 Security: AES-GCM provides semantic security
- Forward Secrecy: Key compromise doesn't affect past data
- Authentication: GCM provides built-in authentication tag
- Initialization: Cryptographically random per-operation IVs
Operational Standards
- Key Rotation: Supported without data re-encryption
- Compliance: NIST SP 800-38D standards adherence
- Memory Protection: Secure zeroization of sensitive data
- Transport: TLS 1.3+ for all key operations
Per-User Encryption
Each user's data is locked with its own AES-256-GCM key, made from their credentials
DEK isolation keeps each user's data completely separate
Tenant Isolation
KEK wrapping stops one tenant from reaching another tenant's keys, even after a database breach
Separation by encryption at the infrastructure level
You Hold Keys
You alone manage the master wrapping key (EWK) with the SDK or API
256-bit entropy minimum, client-side only
Full Control
Rotate keys, revoke them, limit access times, and audit every key action
Manage certificates and keys from start to end, in real time
Schedule-Based Controls
Rules that limit when keys can be used, enforced on a UTC clock across our systems
Restrict operations to maintenance windows • Enforce compliance policies
Complete Audit Logging
Unchangeable logs of every key action, with time, source IP and user
Tamper-evident hashing • Remote append-only storage • 7+ year retention
Data Export & Transparency
Export all your encrypted data in open formats. You control the decryption keys.
No proprietary formats • Open-source client SDKs • Audit logging
No Vendor Locking
Portable encrypted backups, with key escrow options and help moving your data
Cryptographic portability • Multi-platform support • 60-day transition SLA
Threat Model & Mitigations
We built our system to stand up to many kinds of attacks, using encryption and everyday operating controls
Database Breach
Even if our entire database is compromised, encrypted data remains secure.
What helps: Layers of key wrapping mean an attacker needs the EWK you control to reach any user data. They also need each tenant's master KEK, one by one.
Insider Access
Malicious or compromised employees cannot decrypt customer data.
What helps: Keys are never decrypted in unencrypted logs. Audit logs record every access attempt. The logs show tampering, and we watch them.
Legal and Regulatory Requests
For Leased secrets, the key is in your holder. So we cannot decrypt them from storage alone. We could not hand over readable copies from a database. We can still be asked for metadata, such as names and access records.
For Managed secrets, the default: we may be able to decrypt them. Our Privacy Policy describes how we handle legal requests.
Cryptographic Compromise
If someone finds a new weakness in encryption in the future, the impact is limited.
What helps: We use NIST-approved algorithms with 256-bit keys. The takehsm key holder already uses post-quantum hybrid algorithms (ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 alongside X25519 and Ed25519). Other parts of the platform are not post-quantum yet.
Cross-Tenant Contamination
One tenant's data cannot be accessed even with another tenant's key.
What helps: Each tenant's KEK (Key Encryption Key) is mathematically independent of all the others. Encryption and database controls both keep data apart.
Replay Attacks
Replaying encrypted actions or audit logs cannot give anyone access they should not have.
What helps: Each action gets a unique IV, a sequence number and a timestamp. The server drops repeats. This prevents replay attacks on both data and key actions.
Estimated Time to Break Our Encryption
The math behind our security settings, and real-world attack cases
Math shows why breaking our layered encryption is not practical in any real amount of time.
Encryption Break Time Calculator
Change the settings to see how long it would take to break encryption. Takelan uses top industry standards with wide safety margins.
Encryption Settings
Takelan uses AES-256-GCM, the recommended standard
More Settings
It cuts the break time by up to half. An IV is a random number used once per lock. Takelan uses random IVs, far below the point where they repeat (about 0%).
Slide right to see how repeated IVs weaken security
Security check:
This is the strongest setting, and it meets current industry standards.
Estimated time to break
~10^51 years
2^256 operations (IV Collision Risk: 0%)
This assumes all the computing power on Earth works on one attack
Key point: Takelan uses industry-standard encryption building blocks and layers of keys. The encryption is virtually unbreakable. Even in the worst theoretical attack, you would need more power than all systems on Earth combined. It would run for billions of years.
AES-256-GCM Brute Force
Estimated Time:
~2^128 operations
≈ 5.4 × 10^36 years
This assumes all computing power on Earth tries every possible key.
Reality: Brute force is not possible in practice. Say all of Earth's computers test 1 billion keys per nanosecond. Breaking one AES-256 key would still take longer than the age of the universe.
Quantum Computing Threat
Grover's Algorithm (Worst Case):
~2^128 → 2^64 operations
Still ~18.4 × 10^18 years
Even with strong quantum computers (millions of logical qubits), Grover's algorithm only gives a square-root speedup against AES-256.
Status: Symmetric AES-256 is considered safe. Key exchange and signatures are the exposed part, because traffic recorded today could be opened later. Where we control both ends, in the takehsm key holder protocol, we use post-quantum hybrid key exchange and signatures. Elsewhere, public-key cryptography is still classical.
PBKDF2-SHA256 Password Attack
600,000+ Iterations (Current Standard):
Per guess: 600,000 SHA256 operations
~1 millisecond per guess on modern hardware
Even with weak 12-character user passwords, the cost makes dictionary attacks impractical at scale.
- • 95^12 possible passwords ≈ 475 quadrillion combinations
- • At 1 guess/ms: ~15 million years
- • Salt prevents rainbow tables entirely
IV Collision Probability
96-bit Random IV (Birthday Bound):
2^48 encryptions before collision
~281 trillion encryptions
At 1 million encryptions per second (a huge scale), a collision happens after ~8,900 years.
What helps: We use random IVs and make each one unique per action. This stays far below the collision point in real-world use.
Breaking Our Full Multi-Layer Architecture
An attacker would need to break many separate layers at the same time:
Layer 1: AES-256-GCM (Data)
Time: ~10^36 years
Layer 2: AES-256-GCM (DEK)
Time: ~10^36 years
Layer 3: AES-256-GCM (KEK)
Time: ~10^36 years
Layer 4: EWK (Your Control)
Time: ~10^36 years
Combined Attack: Breaking all four layers on their own would need more computing power than anyone has. Our design means that breaking one layer does not expose the others. An attacker would need all four keys to decrypt any data.
Realistic Attack Vectors
- Side-Channel Attacks:
Timing, power and cache attacks. We reduce them with constant-time code and hardware-backed enclaves.
- Implementation Bugs:
More likely than a break in the math. We reduce them with code review and fuzzing.
- Weak Key Generation:
Keys made from too little randomness. We use a CSPRNG (a secure random generator) with 600k+ PBKDF2 rounds.
- Social Engineering:
Stealing user credentials directly. We reduce it with MFA and safe handling of credentials.
Why Our Architecture Wins
- Defense in Depth:
Many separate encryption layers mean one break does not expose data.
- You Control the Master Key:
Even if we're breached, without your EWK, attackers cannot decrypt anything.
- Mathematical Guarantees:
Privacy comes from the design of the encryption. It does not rest on promises.
- Auditability:
We log every key action and you can verify it. We detect a breach right away.
Bottom Line
Breaking Takelan's layered encryption is practically impossible with today's and tomorrow's technology. We use NIST-approved encryption building blocks and layers of key protection. Customer-held keys, where you choose them, are meant to reduce how much you must trust us.
Compliance In Progress
Zero-knowledge mode, which you pick in the Secrets Manager, protects your privacy by design. We are working on SOC 1 and SOC 2 to give you independent checks on top of it. We do not hold these reports yet. We will say so here when we do.
SOC 2
We are working on SOC 2. It covers security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality and privacy controls. This work is in progress. No report is out yet.
SOC 1
We are working on SOC 1. It covers controls that matter to our customers' financial reporting. This work is in progress. No report is out yet.
Privacy by Architecture
We believe compliance should not be added on top of insecure systems. Privacy should be the base of every product we build. We offer customer-held keys as an option for Secrets Manager secrets. You use the takehsm key holder. That puts the key in your hands. It is live. The zero-knowledge options page says what is live.
We are working on SOC 1 and SOC 2 as part of our promise to be open. These standards are separate from our customer-held key option.
Suggestions on how we can make our products even more private? Let us know!
Need More Details?
Have questions about our compliance plans or customer-held keys? We are happy to talk about how our approach fits your security needs.
Contact Our Security Team